The Imagery Exploitation System/Balanced Technology Initiative (IES/BTl) inputs synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery and outputs probabilistically ranked interpretations of the presence and location of military force membership, organiza tion, and expected ground formations. There are also probabilistic models of underlying terrain types from a tactical perspective that provide evidence supporting or denying the presence of forces at a location. The system compares sets of detected military vehicles extracted from imagery against the models of military units and their formations to create evidence of force type and location. Based on this evidence, the system dynamically forms hypotheses of the presence, location and formations of military forces on the ground, which it represents in a dynamically modified Bayesian network.
The Imagery Exploitation System/Balanced Technology Initiative (IES/BTl) inputs synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery and outputs probabilistically ranked interpretations of the presence and location of military force membership, organiza tion, and expected ground formations. There are also probabilistic models of underlying terrain types from a tactical perspective that provide evidence supporting or denying the presence of forces at a location. The system compares sets of detected military vehicles extracted from imagery against the models of military units and their formations to create evidence of force type and location. Based on this evidence, the system dynamically forms hypotheses of the presence, location and formations of military forces on the ground, which it represents in a dynamically modified Bayesian network.
The IES/BTI functional design is based on a decision theoretic model in which processing choices are determined as a utility function of the current state of interpretation of imagery and a top-level goal to exploit imagery as accurately and rapidly as possible, given the available data, current state of the interpretation of force hypotheses and the system processing suite.
Introduction
The Image Exploitation System/Balanced Technology Initiative (IES/BTI) uses synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery, terrain data, and models of military forces to probabilistically rank interpretations of the presence and location of military forces on the ground. Models are mainly obtained by eliciting knowledge from military intelligence analysts. In some cases, models are further refined by statistical analyses of samples of imagery.
Hypotheses of military forces are represented in a dynamically modified Bayesian network. The network has two dimensions. The membership hierarchy captures organizational (i.e. "part-of") relationships between hypothesized units. It forms vehicles into batteries and companies, batteries and companies into battalions, battalions into brigades of regiments, and brigades or regiments into divisions, and divisions into armies. This is pictured in Figure 1 . Forces are also represented in an, orthogonal type (i.e. "is-a") hierarchy. That is, a T-72 tank battalion "is-a" tank battalion (which may be made up of T-72s or the older model T-60s) that "is-a" armor battalion (i.e. tanks or armored personnel carriers) that "is-a" (generic, or Tn-tank-division Tank-division -\ untyped) battalion. A generic battalion is one that cannot, on the basis of observed evidence, be distinguished between armor, artillery or infantry. Because IES/BTI operates on relatively low resolution imagery, many ambiguities and errors arise in the process of detecting vehicles. Military vehicles project to very few picture elements (pixels) in low resolution imagery, so accurate typing of vehicles is usually impossible even for human Image Analysts (lA's). Furthermore, military vehicles are often missed in the imagery detection process. In addition, image processing algorithms that seek to detect military vehicles in low resolution SAR imagery produce very high false alarm rates, typically many times more than the true number of vehicles.
The IES/BTI system addresses the high false alarm rate by using additional information besides the detections to form hypotheses. Probabilistic constraints are modeled over the number and kind of subunits a military force can include and their spacing on the ground. Terrain and tactics interact to modify the way in which forces array themselves. Terrain affects the prior probability that a type of force would prefer one location over another. For example, armored forces prefer to be within a few kilometers of major roads, and artillery units prefer fiat terrain to locating on a slope.
The high vehicle false alarm rate is also mitigated by using hierarchical relations captured in a Bayesian network to reduce the effect of errors. The system reduces the high false alarm rate at the level of individual vehicle detections by applying company-level force models to detections. Then battalion-level models are applied to companies and so on. False alarms go down dramatically as the system moves up the part-of hierarchy.
Results of this approach from a 1988 version of the system are shown in Figure 2 . The SAR had imaged armored forces deployed in Germany, and the system models consisted of prior distributions over Soviet doctrinal tactical organizational and formation constraints. Note the 3950% false alarm rate and the 17% miss rate at the vehicle detection level of processing. As evidence is incrementally accrued, the vehicle level interpretation shows only marginal improvement (final results: 53% misses, 590% false alarms), but the interpretation of the presence and location of battalion level forces is completely accurate with no false alarms. The unit level information is the focus of military planning for targeting and for surveillance management.
IES/BTI is aimed at the automation of imagery exploitation as a front end to human exploitation, (see US Army Topographic Engineering Center, 19920) . Its primary goal is to eliminate the vast bulk of imagery that contains no military forces. The secondary goal is to offer an initial interpretation of hypothesized forces to' assist lAs in focusing their exploitation.
SAR is invaluable because it works both day and night and gives reasonable performance in all weather conditions. But imagery exploitation is extremely fatiguing, especially in unnatural image types like SAR. Furthermore, current collection systems produce far too much imagery for human exploitation. The Department of Defense estimates that over 8000 lAs are needed to exploit the imagery associated to an area the size of Iraq in a single day (Entzminger, 1993) . This figure must be multiplied by the fatigue and human replacement requirements (which grow daily), the numbers of areas of interest (which grow weekly), and the numbers of types of imagery (which grow annually). The armed forces and intelligence agencies cannot afford to staff at these levels, or even to train the required lAs, much less assure the quality of their performance. Although the purpose of the system is to assist SAR lAs, it is worth noting that in independent testing in 1992, IES/BTI successfully performed the low resolution SAR imagery exploitation task at significantly higher accuracy and approximately five times faster than trained, experienced SAR lAs. The tests used imagery of Iraqi forces taken during Desert Storm. The results indicated an average 260% iinprove ment in the performance of lAs using IES/BTI as a front end to their exploitation (see US Army Topographic Engineering Center, 1992b) .
Probabilistic inference in IES/BTI
IES/BTI outputs hierarchical hypotheses of the form: "There is a unit U, in formation F, at world location L, with superior unit QJ, and sub-units {Utt U2, •.. ,Uk}" where each of the QJ and Uj are also hypotheses of this form. Because each hypothesis has a probability of truth, we can rank all hierarchical \ hypotheses and produce a list ordered by probability, or by likelihood ratio, that can be used as an input to a decision theoretic control process, as in Gettys and Willke (1969) , Kelly and Barclay (1973) , Schum (1980) , Levitt, Edwards, Kirby, Winter, Morgan, Mori, Simmes and Smith (19860) and Binford, Levitt and Mann (1989) .
Hypotheses of military units and sub-units are treated as "random variables'! by the system. A random variable is a set of possible states of a real world quantity or object, exactly one of which states is actually true. Random variables have associated probabilities over their states that measure the belief that each state is the true one. The truth of states of one random variable depend on others that are "evidential" to it. For example, if we thought that there was a higher probability that a cluster of military vehicles contained a military unit in truth, (the random variable is "cluster", its states are "true" or "false"), then clearly we should be more willing to believe that a military unit (another random variable with states "true" and "false") is also true. Conversely, if we knew the unit was present in the local region, then we should be more willing to believe that a cluster of detections in this region contains a military unit. In terms of probabilities, we can write these same statements as follows:
This is a simple form of Bayes rule for updating probabilities, hence the use of the term "Bayesian inference", to mean updating probabilities such that all of the above quantities are meaningful and so that the equalities hold true. The unconditioned probabilities, p(unit) and p(cluster) are called the "prior probabilities" that the unit or cluster hypotheses, respectively, are true.
Evidential relationships between random variables can be represented as arrows between nodes of a graph, where random variables are the nodes, and the relationship, "is evidential to", is represented by an arrow between two nodes. Such. a graph is called a "Bayesian netwOlk". Scientific breakthroughs were made by Pearl (1986) , Shachter (1986) and others in the 1980s, in automated computing over Bayesian networks. When an evidential value is changed in a Bayesian network, such as the belief in a detection's state that it is a vehicle, or the match of a detection cluster to a military formation, then automated algorithms can "propagate" the new evidence over the network to revise the probabilities of the other random variables in the network.
The probability propagation algorithms depend on the fact that the Bayesian network actualiy represents the joint probability of all the random variables in the network. Thus if we have a network with three nodes with random variables A, B and C respectively, then the network implicitly represents the joint probability peA, B, C). This is pictured below, with the nodes A, Band C all inter-connected.
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This corresponds to the joint probability of the random variables as follows:
which is one expansion of the product rule for the exact joint probability.
If we drop one of the arrows, for example the arrow between random variable nodes Band C, this corresponds to a conditional independence assumption that the probability,
approximates the fully explicated joint probability. Notice that the diagram has the semantics that a term is present for each node in the diagram, and that for each node, the conditioning terms are those that have arrows directly into the node.
Thus the Bayesian network diagram corresponds to a direct mapping to the joint probability distribution of the random variables in the nodes of the diagram. Figure 3 shows the Bayesian network that is computed by joint probability that is hierarchically computed by IES/BTI, and (implicitly) the set of conditional independence assumptions that the computation embodies. Hierarchy is critical to the control of combinatories in solving the probability model (Ettinger, 1988; Grirnson, 1990) . If, in each term, the conditioning variables are increased by the union of the variables in the following terms, then this equation is simply the product rule for the exact expansion of the joint distribution. The independence assumptions, obtained by omitting arrows, mirror the military force hierarchy; each force size level depends only on the belief in the units (ultimately vehicles) at the next lower level of force organization. Figure 4 shows the decomposition of the joint probability of the random variables created by the hierarchical decomposition of Figure 3 . We detail prior and runtime distributions in the following.
DETECfIONS
Candidate detections are obtained by normalizing the imagery, thresholding below "standard metal return intensity," performing a connected components algorithm and then thresholding above by the maximum possible vehicle size. For the remaining detection candidates, two features are examined to determine the likelihoods of vehicle detection; maximum amplitude of the return and size (number of contiguous pixels above threshold) of the return. Because maximum amplitude is determined mostly by radar scattering features rather than the size of the vehicle, and because radar scattering features tend to be located approximately uniformly over a vehicle, we made the approximation that these features are conditionally independent when conditioned on truth or falsity of the vehicle hypothesis.
Using a large data sample, gamma distributions were fit to: (1) the histogram of maximum amplitudes of detections of vehicles, and (2) the maximum amplitudes of histograms of false alarm detections. For the detection size, a negative binomial density was fitted to the histogram of sizes of vehicle detections, and a geometric " density was fitted to the histogram of sizes of false alarm detections. In all cases a chi-square test was used to do the fitting.
CLUSTERS
Three features are measured to determine company and battalion sized clusters of detections: the number of detections in a cluster, n, the number of them that, according to prior models of military doctrine, are too closely spaced, t, and the average of the likelihoods of the detections being vehicles that is output by the \ FIGURE 3. Bayesian network inference decomposition of IES/BTI. detection process, I. The statistic, t, is a method to model the expected false alarm rate.
Using a chi-squre test, a Poisson distribution was fitted to the density of n for vehicles. A mixed Poisson with two peaks was fitted to the density of t for false alarms. Gamma distributions were fitted to 1 for both vehicles and false alarms. Joint probability of all IES/BTI random variables = p (T, U, H, G, F, V, d,f, r, N, S, C, I, n, I, v Binomial distributions were fitted to t conditioned on n and vehicle or false alarm respectvely.
TERRAIN EVIDENCE
Cluster likelihoods are updated by tactical terrain evidence. The digital terrain database fields are remapped into "tactical terrain types," including those that model support of the terrain for military vehicles (ground cover, hydrology, slope) and accessibility (tree-spacing, slope obstacles, nearness to roads). Military analysts gave these subjective, a priori weights relative to military units of different kinds. These were normalized to one, forming a stochastic process at each point on the ground covered by digital terrain data. The spatial stochastic process indicates p(terrain at this point Icluster existence and force-type), the likelihood at each point on the ground given that a cluster (i.e. possible unit) is detected there and that it contains a force-type. This includes the "no force" force, so that the distribution at \ each point is over an exhsustive set.
The terrain types under a cluster are grouped and the area they occupy is used to normalize the strength of evidence used in the multiplicative Bayesian update. A fully conditionally independent model of updating is used, conditioned on the cluster containing a unit or not. The digital terrain is treated as completely certain, i.e. p(G) = 1. As digital terrain databases are usually errorful, this is an assumption made for the sake of expediency. The uncertainty modeling of digital terrain databases for their systematic and random errors is a consuming study in itself.
The model of independence of the tactical terrain types is justified by their careful choice and prior formulation as explicated in US Army (1972), Levitt, Edwards and Winter (1986b) , Levitt, Winter, Eppel, Irons and Neveu (1987) , US Army (1989) and McKee (1991) . Note that this is a major database re-mapping if it is pre-compiled. The conditional independence is clearly false if the generic fields from the digital terrain database are substituted for the tactical terrain types.
FORCE FORMATION EVIDENCE
Two kinds of models are matched against clusters of vehicles: force size models and point pattern models. The force size is determined by four statistics: number of sub-units, N, distance between subunits, r, frontage, f and depth, d. These are assumed to be conditionally independent of each other conditioned on force being true, or on being a false alarm. These force model prior distributions are determined by subjective elicitation from intelligence and military analysts who are experts in the observed army's doctrine and tactics. They are stored in the force model database and accessed at run-time.
For distributions in which false alarms from image processing are a significant factor, IES/BTI experiments have empirically demonstrated that subjective prob abilities are an inappropriate form of estimation. Humans can no more estimate false alarm radar statistics than they can intuitively determine the statistics of edge detection in human biological vision.
However, considerable research and person-hours have gone into the elicitation of subjective probabilities for modeling prior distributions of military doctrine. Military and intelligence analysts develop good intuitions of force compositions and behavior by combining literature sources (such as historical Soviet army doctrine) with observations of current behavior in multi-source intelligence data.
Between 1989 and 1991, prior distributions were gathered for both Soviet and then Iraqi armies for all units in tank, motorized-rifle and artillery divisions. The distributions included the types and numbers of sub-units, distributions over inter-unit (and vehicle) spacings, and over frontages and depths in defensive deployments. This is illustrated for a standard tank formation in Figure 5 . Distributions over angles in artillery firing patterns were also gathered, although these were only used to choose acceptable match ranges within the matching algorithm. Matching of point patterns, like artillery firing patterns, utilized the algorithms developed by Ettinger (1988) . The probability evaluation of a match depends on the joint distribution of sub-force spacings and the angles defined by triples of points. Triples are dynamically ordered so that they overlap and define a "path" through the space of possible orderings of triples of points, with no triple revisited and adjacent triples always overlapping. Prior experimentation determines thresholds for acceptable variation of angles. These are tight enough that p(formation Iunit type) :: 1 if the formation matches, otherwise O. This is multiplied by the same expression above for peN, r, f, d Iunit) to get the final probability.
VEHICLE CLASSIFICATION IES/BTI is intended to accept input from a separate automatic target recognition (A TR) system, although no such system is currently providing inputs. This capability was simulated for testing purposes. An ATR system processes small, high-resolution SAR images called "chips", in which there are many thousands of pixels on a vehicle. At such resolution it is possible to classify the type of a vehicle with reasonable accuracy, although still with significant uncertainty. Vehicle classification provides evidence to distinguish between armored force types and between armor and infantry. Due to error in determining the ground coordinates of the image chips, i.e. error in image-to-map registration, the vehicle classification evidence is not useful to determine the "truth" of clusters. However, higher level forces occupy enough area that they are useful in confirming and typing them. 
EVIDENCE PROPAGATION
Bayes nets are dynamically created based on evidence from matching of formations. Because the numbers, types and formations of military forces are highly variable and cannot be known with exactness, and because results of one evidence gathering task may invalidate the need for ones previously requested, dynamic hypothesis creation and dynamic task reprioritization are required. As a consequence, in 1987 IES/BTI (when it was called INTACTS) was the first system to dynamically generate, modify and solve Bayesian networks based on evidence incrementally accrued from evidence gathering operations (Levitt, Binford & Ettinger, 1990) .
Evidence propagation uses Pearl's (1986) algorithm. This requires that the Bayes net be singly connected, that is, have at most one directed path between any two Bayes nodes. A Bayes node merging algorithm checks for this condition, merging multiple parents as conflicting if necessary. Examination of the graph in Figure 3, shows that merging of nodes happens for the triple (I, n, t), and for the quadruple of nodes (d,f, r, N) . However the actual update is performed (with required Bayesian "flips") as shown in Pearl's algorithm is illustrated in Figure 6 and described below in terms of a simple Bayes net example. Consider a battalion node, X, linked to a company node, Y. The link connecting the two nodes specify these probabilities: p(particular company configuration Iparticular battalion configuration). These conditional probabilities form the elements of a matrix, M(y Ix), where the (i, j)th the entry specifies p(YJ IXi), Xi and YJ being the configurations of battalions and companies respectively. Messages passed between Bayes nodes consist of probability vectors providing data-driven evidential support (child to parent) or model-driven support (patent to child). Evidence coming into a node is of the form: p(features Iy). Image evidence for a Bayes company node consists of the message: {p(image features Icompany), p(image features Ifalse alarm)}.
A model-driven support message from a node X to its child Y, consists of a vector derived by dividing (component-wise) the current belief vector by the current evidential message from Y to X.
Upon receiving a new message from a parent or child, a Bayes node X, computes its overall evidential support vector D x , by doing component-wise multiplication of all evidential vectors, D Xt , from all its children, Yj' The new resulting belief vector is the result of Dx [(transpose of Mwx)C w ], where the exterior multipication is component-wise and the interior multiplication is matrix. C w is the model-driven support message from the node's parent, W, and Mwx is the conditional probability matrix from W to X. Figure 7 shows a set of six company level hypotheses being aggregated to form battalions. Spacing is such that, based on the prior model of doctrinal behavior, only one or two battalions could be present. Based again on prior models, only three aggregations are possible. There is uncertainty about each as one of two types, tank or motorized-rifle. Doctrinally, battalions do not spatially overlap, so B2 cannot coexist with either of B1 or B3. This gives 11 possible configurations that are grouped together to form competing hypotheses in the Bayes node.
Decision theoretic control methodology
IES/BTI processes a stream of images ranging in size from 25 to 160 megabytes per image. The processing philosophy is one of incremental, coarse-to-fine reduction of data from many megabytes per image down to the critical hypotheses of the presence and location of units, a few kilobytes of data. The imagery and digital terrain data are 2D-spatial. The inherent combinatories of inferencing caused by the uncertainties in input and prior knowledge of military doctrine can only be dealt with effectively, Le. non-exponentially, if we take advantage of the parallelism inherent in the spatial representations.
To accomplish this, IES/BTI uses a heterogeneous network of parallel computers (Guarino, Kruger, Sayre, Sos, Turner & Winter, 1988) . A Connection Machine 2 (CM2) (see Hillis, 1985; Rose & Steele, 1987; Hillis & Steele, 1986) , is used as the SIMD processor for initial data parallel operations of vehicle detection and clustering, and application of tactical terrain evidence to the clusters. The MIMD processor is an Encore Multimax used for control parallel operations of aggregating clusters into higher level units, formation matching, and typing of forces by fusion of vehicle classifications (Hatcher, Quinn, Lapadula, Severs, Anderson, & Jones, 1991) .
An agenda/ledger mechanism is used to perform asynchronous processing. The inference component posts proposed processing tasks to an agenda that is read asynchronously by the control component. Results of task processing are posted by control back to a ledger memory space that is read asynchronously by inference.
Inference and control cooperate to create a decision theoretic functional control of the system. Inference values each proposed a task according to its expected contribution to the final answer of locating units on the ground. Control creates a task utility from these values by dividing by expected processing times (which depends dynamically upon available resources) to determIne a utility function that maintains a rank order of processing priority. The following loop iterates within inference. 
\
The decision of which actions to execute, is solved by a greedy algorithm in priority order of task value. The alternative orderings of actions (each representing a decision policy) are not explicitly generated and evaluated. The use of this simple processor allocation algorithm assumes, a priori, that the utility order of actions is the best decision policy.
Task values are determined as a hierarchical value of information as in Levitt, Bindford and Ettinger (1990) . Top level values are determined by a prior ranking of priorities for finding certain types of military units as follows.
Value (subunit, action)= Ip (parent I subuni t, action)
where:
action-outcomes
Note that p(parent) and Value(parent) are already known by the state of the Bayes net and by induction respectively.
Results and independent evaluation
Typical processing results are shown in Notice that IES/BTI found the same forces as the lAs. The lAs had access to visible spectrum, electro-optical(EO) imagery over the same area, and used it to recognize vehicle types, which was not possible using the SAR imagery alone. Using type information, the lAs were able to note the mixture of support vehicles with shooting vehicles, inferring that there was only a battalions worth of shooters. IES/BTI, being unable to differentiate vehicles, counted a brigade's worth of vehicles and therefore indicated the force levels as such. This is typical of good behavior of the system. Most scenes were of this quality. However, the Iraqis, illustrating much less discipline (and good sense) than the Soviets, sometimes used doctrinally unusual tactics.
Figure 8(c) shows image truth of a typical "bad" Iraqi grouping of forces. On this much more complex scene, lAs needed the EO imagery to differentiate groups of vehicles into units, although they were also able to utilize some shape information in formations that is not currently part of the features modeled in IES/BTI formation matching. . US army independent user test assessment results .
• : IES/BTI assisted; *; assisted centroid; 0: unassisted. unassisted centroid.
As shown in Figure 8 (d), IES/BTI did not find all of these forces, although those it found overlapped almost exactly with image truth. This is typical of the worst performance of the system, but such situations account for only about 5% of the large sample of imagery from Desert Storm.
In the spring of 1992, the US army conducted an independent blind evaluation of IES/BTI on a large sample of Desert Storm imagery that the system had nol' been developed or tested with. The "User Test Assessment" was reported in US army Topographic Engineering Center (1992b) . Nineteen lAs were gathered at the US Army Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca. A copy of the hardware/software IES/BTI system was installed there also. The lAs were all veterans of SAR imagery analysis from Desert Storm. They were asked to exploit the imagery in unlimited time, and then in no more than 15 min. These exercises were done with and without the results of IES/BTI on the system to assist them. (The imagery presentation was mixed so that it was unlikely an analyst could recognize the same image in testing.) Six of the many data compilations evaluating results are shown in Figure 9 .
Note that analysts had only the imagery to exploit, no EO imagery or other collateral sources. In Figure 8(a)-(d) , "Limited events" means the 15 min limit. "CORR" is the accuracy of reported unit locations against all-source image truth. "COMP" is the percent of true units reported versus all those in the imagery.
It is clear in these results that the distributions of performance (1) without the use of IES/BTI and (2) with the use of IES/BTI, cleanly separate and are much in the favor of IES/BTI assistance to lAs. From a scientific perspective, and as a landmark in automated image understanding systems, it is worth noting that the fully automated IES/BTI performance averaged approximately twice the detection rate, half the false alarm rate and five times faster than the average unassisted, unlimited-time performance of expert human lAs.
Discussion
Despite its great success, the development of IES/BTI has raised many more scientific questions and engineering challenges than it has answered. Perhaps the most pressing of these is raised by the necessary lack of statistically significant data samples and the serious unknowns that result. In the scientific sense, we seem always to be in the business of fighting the last war, or surveilling the last year's army and theater. How robust are the models of military doctrine against different composi tions of equipment, different tactics and different terrain?
Of course, one of the advantages of the Bayesian probabilistic approach is that the evidential updating methodology rigorously supports subjective elicitation of prob ability distributions, as proven by de Finetti (1937) instead of requiring that they be estimated from samples, as do classical approaches to statistical inference. However, expert estimation suffers to some degree from the same source of systematic error, namely that they are biased by prior observations and experience, which the history of warfare and intelligence work has shown to be a highly fallible guide.
We call the problem of robust cross-army, cross-theater, and cross-terrain modeling that of discovering "universalist doctrine." Are there sets of constraints and probability distributions that are based on:
\
• physical limitations of equipment of large group operations, • the nature of terrain and the movement of equipment and troops, • the need to re-supply, move, survive, fire weapons, and • the necessary tactics of moving forward and holding ground, that can be parameterized to account for most conceivable conditions of conven tional warfare?
Even uncritically accepting human expert subjective estimates, we are still necessarily in the situation that the wide array of military contexts that can be encountered imply that it is unlikely we can continue to rely upon access or even existence of sufficient human military and intelligence expertise to rapidly model the new threat or surveillance requirement.
One alternative is to consider a rapid, semi-automated bootstrapping mode that adapts existing priors to the current situation and integrates new features as guided by a few human experts. The methodology of such "rapid target insertion" is an open research question.
This can also be an approach to dealing with the modeling of false alarm statistics. However, we note that our current false alarm models are poor. The radar imagery world has been plagued by lack of success in characterizing the returns of radar in natural terrain, for example, since the 1960s.
Another area of on-going investigation concerns hypothesis generation and evidential attribution. The data and evidence in IES/BTI, and in imagery under standing generally, is necessarily multidimensional. It is arguable that spatial evidence should be viewed in an inherently disjunctive manner, as opposed to symbolic data that naturally attributes in a conjunctive fashion. To clarify: given two symbolic propositons, and a piece of evidence that should discriminate between them, multiplicative, or conjunctive, updating seems the natural model of attribu tion. However, in a spatial context, it is a priori unclear whether a piece of evidence "at a point," attributes only locally, or whether it can apply to one or more hypotheses associated to adjacent areas. For example, in IES/BTI, a vehicle detection at a point supports a force hypothesis of a unit whose centroid is likely to be removed from the point of evidence. Stein and Winter (1993) suggest that an additive, or disjunctive, updating scheme of evidential attribution might be a better scientific model for accrual of this sort of evidence.
The heterogeneous parallel processing environment and utility-based control in IES/BTI, although on the bleeding edge of the state of the art, is still only a beginning Weems, 1991) . The hardest problems in distributed and parallel scheduling and control present themselves at every step. GiVen that many of the communication, prioritization, load balancing, and schedul-\ ing problems are NP-hard, there are fundamental questions of which attributes of processing are more scientifically advantageous to use to prune the search and execution problem. To what extent must domain considerations guide efficient processing? It is clearly desirable from a computer science perspective to make these answers as domain independent as possible. One conjecture is that a sufficiently sophisticated hierarchical (domain-dependent) decision-theoretic value scheme might provide sufficient heuristics to solve the allocation problem.
IES/BTI (as ADRIES) was initiated in the early 19808 by Clint Kelly at DARPA and Ed
